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Michigan v. EPA 
Gretel Lee† 
“I think it is incredibly presumptuous and elitist for political 
scientists to conclude that the American people’s cultural 
values in fact are not ones that lend themselves to a cost-benefit 
analysis and to presume that [the American people] would 
change their cultural values if in fact they were aware of the 
cost-benefit analysis.”1 — Joseph Biden 
Introduction 
On June 29, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States 
struck down the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS) 
provision under the Clean Air Act in a landmark 5-4 decision.2  
The Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
acted unreasonably by implementing the MATS provision when it 
determined that regulation of mercury emissions from electric 
utility steam generating units (EGUs) was “appropriate and 
necessary,”3 because the EPA did not take the cost of compliance 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School.  I would like to 
thank Professors Brad Karkkainen and June Carbone for their assistance, edits, 
and suggestions as I wrote and re-wrote this piece.  I also want to thank my family 
for helping me solidify my thinking and for supporting me through this process.  It 
is an honor and a privilege to be able to share my thoughts and ideas on this very 
important set of issues in this manner. 
 1. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 
310 (1994) (statement of Hon. Joseph Biden, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 2. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711–12 (2015). 
 3. Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). For the 
purposes of clarity, please note that § 7412 is used interchangeably in court 
documents and supplemental sources with its common citation, Clean Air Act 
(CAA) § 112(n)(1)(A). “Appropriate and necessary” as interpreted by the EPA 
serves as the rationale for regulation “after studying hazards to public health posed 
by power-plant emissions.” Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2701. Furthermore, the “EPA 
found power-plant regulation ‘appropriate’ because the plants’ emissions pose risks 
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by the industry into account in the initial stages of regulation.4  In 
adding to an already tumultuous history of regulating (and not 
regulating) EGU emissions,5 the Supreme Court unanimously 
moved in the direction of requiring cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for 
major regulatory actions.6  This occurred despite differing opinions 
on how CBA can and should be implemented, ultimately affecting 
the outcome of the merits of the case.  While CBA serving as a 
justification for the implementation of a regulation is by no means 
unheard of, the implications of this unanimous move are serious 
and far-reaching, requiring each agency to conduct an in-depth 
analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed action.  The 
Supreme Court has effectively held that the direct7 benefits of new 
proposed regulations must outweigh the direct costs of complying 
with the new regulation.  The EPA, in this case, used the 
monetized benefits of preventing the reduction of IQ points in 
recreational anglers and their children who consumed their catch, 
an amount totaling four to six million dollars annually in direct 
benefits (despite the tens of billions of dollars in ancillary 
benefits).8  The Court contrasted these benefits with the costs of 
compliance, an amount totaling approximately $9.6 billion 
annually.9  These figures stand in stark, obvious contrast to one 
another.  In order for new regulations to withstand this latest 
 
to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing 
these emissions were available. It found regulation ‘necessary’ because the 
imposition of other Clean Air Act requirements did not eliminate those risks.”  Id. 
 4. Id. at 2705 (noting that although § 112(d) requires the consideration of cost 
for “beyond-the-floor standards,” the statute does not note the manner in which the 
costs are to be considered). 
 5. The EPA’s various mercury regulations have been subject to much 
litigation, and have been enacted, vacated, overruled, and reenacted.  A history of 
these regulations is discussed in Section I(A). 
 6. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712; see also id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(describing how the EPA considered costs in creating the MATS provision); Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (describing how agencies 
must consider the costs and benefits of new regulations in addition to non-
regulatory means of achieving regulatory goals). 
 7. Direct benefits are those that can be completely quantified and result from 
the purpose of the rule; in Michigan v. EPA, it is the benefits from mercury 
reduction.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2721.  Direct benefits do not include ancillary 
benefits, which are benefits derived from the manner in which the mercury is 
monitored.  Id. at 2711.  In Michigan v. EPA, ancillary benefits included reductions 
in other harmful emissions, like particulate matter.  See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 
2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 2706 (“The Agency could not fully quantify the benefits of reducing 
power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants; to the extent it could, it 
estimated that these benefits were worth $4 to $6 million per year.”). 
 9. Id. 
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requirement, these figures need to stand on the opposite ends of 
the CBA spectrum from where they presently reside. 
On remand to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, the EPA can improve its intentions in 
regulating EGUs.  This includes taking impacts on populations 
other than recreational anglers into account, in particular taking 
into account Native American peoples with the appropriated 
rights to fisheries.  These peoples attach cultural significance to 
fishing and consuming fish, and yet their interests were left out of 
the EPA’s analysis.  Currently, the EPA is moving forward with 
the claim that there is no mandatory formal CBA, which the 
Supreme Court has also claimed.10  Thus, the MATS regulation 
remains within the realm of requirements under the “appropriate 
and necessary” regulation umbrella, despite the Supreme Court 
overruling their regulation.11  Seeing as the Supreme Court is 
unanimously moving in the direction of mandating that agencies 
consider costs in a more formalized manner (though claiming it is 
still up to the agencies to decide how to quantify them),12 agencies 
need to expand the scope of the possible direct benefits of proposed 
regulations.  The weight given to Executive Order 12,866 also 
brings attention to other pertinent Executive Orders, which need 
to be given weight by agencies and courts alike, including 
Executive Order 12,898 on environmental justice, ordered by 
President Clinton.13 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA is part of a 
growing insistence on CBA as necessary to justify regulatory 
actions.  These legal developments have worked to hamstring 
regulatory efforts to protect less powerful groups, especially with 
respect to environmental concerns.  While a growing literature 
addresses the limitation of CBA,14 the majority of literature 
published on the subject does not address the specific impacts on 
 
 10. Id. at 2711. 
 11. Supplemental Finding That it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil- Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75025 (proposed Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 12. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711. 
 13. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order 
No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
 14. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999); Xavier Dupuis, Applications and Limitations of Cost-
Benefit Analysis as Applied to Cultural Development, UNESCO (1985), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000819/081977eo.pdf; Jonathan Masur & 
Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016). 
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Native American concerns.  This is particularly true where the 
loss is a threat to broad-based environmental interests (loss of 
fish, for example, across a broad area rather than effects 
concentrated on reservations), Native American cultural concerns, 
as opposed to strict economic concerns, or where the impact affects 
a relatively small number of Native Americans in comparison with 
a larger group of non-Native Americans.  All of these factors are 
present in Michigan v. EPA. 
The purpose of this Article is to encourage the EPA and, in a 
larger sense, all federal agencies to reform the manner in which 
they conduct CBA in order to give greater weight to benefits that 
are inherently harder to quantify, and extend beyond the single 
dimension of strict monetization.  In particular, the EPA should 
move in the direction of including more wide-scale benefits in 
regulatory decision-making, as exemplified by inclusion of the 
benefits faced by mercury reduction in Native American 
populations, and in manners previously deemed “unquantifiable” 
through the inclusion of Bayesian CBA.15  The Supreme Court has 
claimed that ancillary benefits cannot be included in the primary 
CBA.16  Thus, with the inclusion of the effects of hazardous air 
pollutants (HAP) on a wider scale (specifically here, mercury and 
its impacts on subsistence fishing populations), the benefits in the 
reduction of mercury pollution forces the scale of costs versus 
benefits towards a balanced proportion, bringing the agency closer 
to being within the boundaries of compliance under the 
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court. 
Part I provides a brief background in the Michigan v. EPA 
regulation battle, and an explanation as to why these regulations 
are being challenged.  Part II discusses the effects of 
methylmercury on the human body and the reasoning that went 
into the decision to regulate mercury emissions.  Part III consists 
of an analysis of the impacts of environmental regulation on 
Native American communities across the United States, their 
constitutional and treaty rights to apportionment fishing and legal 
protection, and how this has been and continues to be largely 
ignored in the EPA’s analysis.  This section will conclude with a 
brief discussion on federalism constraints and related ongoing 
 
 15. This raises the issue of whether Native Americans can successfully argue 
that the EPA had independent authority to address this issue without CBA at all.  
This discussion, however, is outside the scope of this Article. 
 16. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (“Even if the Agency could have considered 
ancillary benefits when deciding whether regulation is appropriate and 
necessary—a point we need not address—it plainly did not do so here.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
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litigation.  Part IV is comprised of a discussion on Bayesian CBA, 
and how the EPA, and other agencies, moving forward, can 
implement previous “unquantifiable” benefits into their own 
analyses.  This particular analysis will use the effects on Native 
American communities as an area where the EPA could have 
shown significant benefits in regulating harmful mercury 
emissions. 
I. Background—Michigan v. EPA and Regulations 
a. Regulation of EGUs Under the Clean Air Act—It is 
”Appropriate and Necessary” to Regulate Mercury 
Emissions17 
“The Administrator [of the EPA] shall regulate [EGUs] under 
this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is 
appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the 
study required by this subparagraph.”18 
 
EGUs are major stationary sources, and thus are regulated 
differently than other sources under § 112 of the Clean Air Act 
(CAA).19  Under the 1990 CAA Amendments, EGUs were singled 
out for their large emissions and for the resulting impact on 
surrounding communities and, as a result, had stricter regulations 
imposed on them.20  They were required to implement new forms 
 
 17. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari for Petitioner, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46) 
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (citing Regulatory Finding on the 
Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,830) (stating that the EPA found it appropriate to 
regulate EGUs and noting that EGUs “are the largest domestic source of mercury 
emissions, and mercury in the environment presents significant hazards to public 
health and the environment.”).  Note that the following section is a brief and 
simplified summary of the legal proceedings as understood by the author.  For a 
more in-depth summary of the background leading up to the decision in Michigan 
v. EPA, see the EPA’s Remand Legal Memorandum, summarizing the statutory 
and legal history of EGU regulations. 
 18. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 19. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘major source’ 
means any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a 
contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit 
considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any hazardous 
air pollutants or 25 tons per year or more of any combination of hazardous air 
pollutants.”). 
 20. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) (2012) (“The Administrator shall 
conduct, and transmit to the Congress not later than 4 years after November 15, 
1990, a study of mercury emissions from electric utility steam generating units, 
municipal waste combustion units, and other sources, including area sources. Such 
study shall consider the rate and mass of such emissions, the health and 
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of technology, including flue scrubbers under the Acid Rain 
Provisions.21  The EPA published a list of these sources under § 
112(c) of the CAA.22  The EPA first found regulation of coal- and 
oil-fired EGUs “appropriate and necessary” in 2000 after 
conducting two and evaluating three studies together under § 
112(n)(1). 
Section 112(n)(1)(A) required the EPA to conduct a study of 
the hazards to public health from HAP emissions from EGUs that 
will remain after imposition of the other provisions of the CAA and 
determine whether there are controls available to reduce HAP 
emissions from EGUs (Utility Study).  Section 112(n)(1)(B) 
required the EPA to study mercury emissions from EGUs and all 
other sources of mercury, and to determine the rate and mass of 
the mercury emissions, the health and environmental effects of 
such emissions, and the availability and cost of controls to reduce 
such emissions (Mercury Study).  Section 112(n)(1)(C) required the 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) to 
conduct a third study related to the threshold level of mercury in 
fish tissue that can be consumed without adverse effects to public 
health (NIEHS Study).23 
The EPA issued its finding in light of the results of these 
three studies in 2000, concluding that it was “appropriate and 
necessary” to regulate mercury emissions from EGUs.  “[B]ased on 
particular facts and circumstances, including its determination 
that EGUs ‘are the largest domestic source of mercury emissions, 
and mercury in the environment presents significant hazards to 
public health and the environment.’”24 
The EPA changed course in 2005, and reversed their initial 
finding.  “At that time, EPA interpreted § 7412(n)(1)(A)’s phrase 
‘after imposition of the requirements’ of the Act to include both 
requirements already in effect and those that EPA ‘reasonably 
anticipates will be implemented and will result in reductions of 
 
environmental effects of such emissions, technologies which are available to control 
such emissions, and the costs of such technologies.”). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2012). 
 22. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c).  The EGUs of importance to this 
analysis are the coal- and oil-fired EGUs. 
 23. Legal Memorandum Accompanying the Proposed Supplemental Finding 
that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from 
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (EGUs) (Nov. 20, 
2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/20151120legal
memo.pdf. 
 24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 5 (citing Regulatory 
Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,830) (Dec. 20, 2000)). 
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utility HAP emissions.’”25  The EPA found the regulation 
redundant in light of other statutory safeguards under the CAA, 
and brought into focus the high cost of compliance and the 
underlying inefficiency of regulating EGUs at such a high cost 
with a seemingly low demonstrated benefit.26  The EPA 
subsequently removed EGUs from regulation under CAA § 112(c).  
Instead, the EPA issued the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), 
which served as a form of “cap-and trade” regulation.27 
In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that 
the attempt to remove the EGUs from the § 7412(c) list was 
unlawful after individual States challenged the EPA’s 2005 
decision to delist EGU regulation.28  More specifically, the court 
held that “Congress required EPA to make specific determinations 
about the health effects of HAP emissions from EGUs before 
deleting them from the list, and EPA had not satisfied those 
requirements.”29  This ruling vacated the CAMR.30 
In 2012, the EPA determined it was not authorized to 
consider costs in deciding whether regulation was appropriate 
under § 112 of the CAA, and deemed regulation of EGUs to be 
appropriate if any single HAP emitted from EGUs is hazardous to 
public health or the environment, effectively reaffirming its 2000 
finding.31  This decision led to the challenges brought by individual 
 
 25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 6 (citing Revision of 
December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants 
From Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units From the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 15,994, 15,999) (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63)). 
 26. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing the 
reason for the overruling of the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR)). 
 27. Neb. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, EPA Vacates Clean Air Mercury Rule, AIR 
WAVES (July 2008), http://www.deq.state.ne.us/AirWaves.nsf/cf7e4bdd49c643bf
8625747f005a1515/9de6c40a1a1c49688625747f005bc786; see also New Jersey, 517 
F.3d at 577.  “Cap-and-Trade” is a market-based regulation, which allows polluters 
to buy and sell pollution credits after the market is set at a certain limit.  See 
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate 
Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008).  While “cap-and-trade” is still a form 
of regulation, it is a market-based regulation that the Court vacated because the 
EPA, by implementing the market-based incentives, took mercury out from under 
regulation of CAA § 112, Hazardous Air Pollutants, which require Maximum 
Achievable Control Technology (MACT), and regulation in order to protect human 
health.  New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 579–80. 
 28. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582–83. 
 29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 7 (citing New Jersey v. 
EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581–82) (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 30. See New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 578 (vacating the Clean Air Mercury Rule). 
 31. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and 
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance 
for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and 
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states and utilities in White Stallion Energy v. EPA32 and 
Michigan v. EPA.33 
b. The March of White Stallion—Individual States and 
Utilities Brought Suit Claiming that Costs of 
Compliance Must be Considered When Promulgating 
Regulatory Schemes 
In White Stallion Energy, state, industry, and labor parties 
challenged the EPA’s decision reaffirming the outcome of the 2000 
case.34  Twenty-two states challenged the regulations along with 
industry and labor petitioners,35 while sixteen states and the 
District of Columbia, along with environmental and public health 
intervenors, supported the regulations.36  The petitioners listed a 
number of oppositions to the relisting of the 2000 finding; a 
number of which the court did not rule on.37  The most pertinent 
objection is the second one listed, regarding the petitioners’ 
objection to the EPA’s interpretation of “appropriate and 
necessary,” and it not including the costs of compliance due to 
regulation, i.e. objection ultimately ruled on and reversed by the 
Supreme Court.38  Specifically, the petitioners refer to the 2005 
decision, which allowed considerations of cost to be included into 
the greater regulatory analysis of “appropriate;”39 they objected to 
the new decision not to include costs in a strict manner40 (as 
opposed to them being brought into the greater consideration 
through best available implemented technology).41 Petitioners 
contend that not including costs “unreasonably constrains the 
language of § 112(n)(1)(A),”42 citing a dictionary definition of 
“appropriate” and the differences inherent in the regulation of 
EGUs under § 112(n)(1)(A), and other sources under § 112(c).43  
Most pertinently, the petitioners pointed to precedent, citing “only 
 
Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 
9304, 9310–11 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63). 
 32. 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 33. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 34. White Stallion Energy, 748 F.3d at 1229. 
 35. Id. at 1226–29. 
 36. Id. at 1230–32. 
 37. See id. at 1234. 
 38. Id. at 1236–41. 
 39. Id. at 1236. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 42. White Stallion Energy, 748 F.3d at 1236 (internal citation omitted). 
 43. Id. 
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where there is ‘clear congressional intent to preclude consideration 
of cost’ [do] we find agencies barred from considering costs.”44  The 
court ultimately ruled that the EPA was correct in their 
interpretation of “appropriate and necessary” and did not need to 
consider cost in their analysis for EGU emission regulation, 
claiming that “[o]n its face, § 112(n)(1)(A) neither requires EPA to 
consider costs nor prohibits EPA from doing so.”45 
Judge Kavanaugh dissented as to Part I of the opinion, 
foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision on the 
matter.46  Judge Kavanaugh begins his analysis with the 
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard for 
EGUs under § 112(d),47 and allows his analysis to evolve into a 
discussion over “appropriate”; claiming that regulation of EGUs 
has already been deemed “necessary” in response to the studies 
required under § 112(n)(1).48  Judge Kavanaugh claims that the 
MACT program requires the consideration of costs, even for EGUs, 
and thus it was wrong for the EPA to find otherwise.49 
II. Effects of Methylmercury (MeHg) 
a. Background on the Emissions of Mercury 
Mercury is a naturally occurring element found in the 
environment, most commonly in rock-like substances.50  According 
 
 44. Id. (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001)). 
 45. Id. at 1237. 
 46. Id. at 1258 (Kavanuagh, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 1259–60 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  In explaining the MACT 
standards and the listing process, Judge Kavanaugh stated: 
EPA uses a two-step process for setting MACT standards.  It begins by 
setting a minimum stringency level, or “floor,” based on the performance of 
the best-performing units in a particular source category.  At that first 
step, EPA may not consider costs.  Once the agency sets the statutory 
floor, it then determines, considering cost and other factors listed in 
Section 112(d)(2), whether an even more restrictive standard is 
“achievable.” . . . [T]he MACT program[] applies automatically to most 
sources of hazardous air pollutants.  But for . . . [EGUs], Congress devised 
an alternative system as set forth in Section 112(n)(1)(A) of the [CAA].  
The alternative system erects two threshold hurdles before EPA may 
regulate [EGUs] under the MACT program. (internal citations omitted). 
Id. at 1259 (J. Kavanuagh, dissenting).  These steps are the studies mandated 
under § 112(n).  As previsouly discussed, the next step is the “appropriate and 
necessary” determination by the administrator. 
 48. Id. at 1260 (J. Kavanaugh, dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 1261 (J. Kavanugh, dissenting) (“It is entirely unreasonable for EPA 
to exclude consideration of costs in determining whether it is ‘appropriate’ to 
regulate electric utilities under the MACT program.”). 
 50. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY,  
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to the EPA, methylmercury is an elemental mercury that 
methylizes; it is “a[n] organic mercury compound[] . . . [and is] 
formed when mercury combines with carbon[] . . . [and] is the most 
common organic mercury compound found in the environment.”51  
Nearly all of the mercury found in fish and their tissues is 
methylmercury.52  It is found naturally in coal deposits and 
emitted into the air when coal is burned in EGUs.53  Utilities 
operate at temperatures above 2000 degrees Fahrenheit, and thus 
the mercury present in the “coal and oil is vaporized and 
exhausted as a gas[,]” resulting in the emissions.54 One of the 
reasons that methylmercury is of such high concern to the EPA 
and experts is because of its ability and tendency to travel and 
settle in soil composites and water, resulting in bioaccumulation in 
natural beings, primarily fish and other aquatic animals.55  
Bioaccumulation occurs when fish consume smaller organisms in 
which mercury has carbonated, and the toxicity works its way 
through the food chain, resulting in consumption of the larger (and 
thus more highly concentrated) fish by humans.56  Human 
consumption of fish and other seafood is the largest reason for the 
accumulation of methylmercury in humans, and the resulting 
harms that come from it.57 
 
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/basic-information-about-mercury (last visited Mar. 30, 
2017) [hereinafter BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MERCURY IN THE ENVIRONMENT, 
https://www2.usgs.gov/themes/factsheet/146-00/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2016). 
 53. BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY, supra note 51. 
 54. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS & 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS, VOL. II: AN 
INVENTORY OF ANTHROPOGENIC MERCURY EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 4–6 
(December 1997), http://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/112nmerc/volume2.pdf [hereinafter 
INVENTORY OF ANTHROPOGENIC MERCURY EMISSIONS]. 
 55. Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury, COMM. ON THE TOXICOLOGICAL 
EFFECTS OF METHYLMERCURY, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL 16 (2000), http://www.nap.edu/
read/9899/chapter/1. [hereinafter Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury]. 
 56. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,827, 79,827–829 (Dec. 20, 
2000). 
 57. See Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury, supra note 56, at 16 (stating 
that human exposure to methylmercury “from contaminated fish and seafood can 
pose a variety of health risks.”). 
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b. Effects of Methylmercury on the Human Body—Through 
the Developing Brain and Beyond 
As stated above, one of the primary problems that stems from 
mercury emissions is the negative effect on the human body, 
which primarily comes through the consumption of fish.58 
Studies indicate that there is no positive role mercury plays 
in the human body and that even very low doses have adverse 
impacts on people.59  Damage from mercury ingestion and 
exposure has resulted in harm to the cardiovascular, immune, and 
reproductive systems,60 and severely inhibits the performance of 
the liver, kidneys, and—of most pertinence importance to this 
analysis—the nervous system.61  These impacts result in tremors, 
impaired vision and hearing, paralysis, insomnia, and emotional 
instability.62 
Throughout its mercury studies and as justification for their 
efforts to regulate mercury emissions, the EPA has focused on the 
impacts that methylmercury has on the developing brain, and 
ultimately the impacts of lower IQ points that will be explained 
below.63  If the mercury is ingested by the mother while she is 
pregnant, it remains in her body for approximately forty-four to 
eighty days64 and hinders the healthy development of the fetus’s 
brain.65  The mercury moves through the body as it is absorbed by 
the gastrointestinal tract and enters the bloodstream, and 
ultimately may enter the fetal brain.66  In a pregnant woman, it 
 
 58. BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY, supra note 51. 
 59. Génon Jensen & Karolina Ruzickova, Halting the Child Brain Drain: Why 
We Need to Tackle Global Mercury Contamination 18 (2006), http://www.env-
health.org/IMG/pdf/2-_Halting_the_child_brain_drain_Why_we_need_to_tackle_
global_mercury_contamination.pdf. 
 60. Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury, supra note 56, at 147–250 
(discussing the human health effects of the consumption of methylmercury as 
derived from various study designs). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS 
STANDARDS (2011), http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf 
[hereinafter FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS]. 
 64. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING POPULATIONS AT 
RISK FROM MERCURY EXPOSURE 27 (2008), http://www.who.int/foodsafety/
publications/chem/mercuryexposure.pdf (noting that the half-life of mercury is 
approximately forty-four to eighty days). 
 65. Id. at 29 (“Because methylmercury-cysteine conjugate readily passes both 
the placental barrier and the blood-brain barrier and the developing fetus is 
especially sensitive to the toxic effects of methylmercury, exposures during 
pregnancy are of highest concern.”). 
 66. Id. at 27. 
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can eventually find its way into cord blood and placental tissue, 
resulting in even higher mercury concentrations; some studies 
indicate mercury levels in the fetus up to twice as high as 
maternal blood mercury levels.67  This is particularly concerning 
because methylmercury cannot break down into less harmful 
subcomponents. Many of the disorders caused by methylmercury 
come to light after the babies are born, as they grow and develop 
into young children.68  High methylmercury levels can result in 
Attention Deficit Disorder and in particularly low scores on tests 
of fine-motor skills, neurobehavioral tests, attention, language, 
verbal memory, and visual-spatial abilities.69 
Perhaps the most concerning effect, as evidenced by the 
EPA’s assessment,70 is the measured drop in IQ in children.  This 
is perhaps evidenced by the symptoms listed above, though it does 
fall somewhat into its own category.  IQ drops have historically 
been measured in loss of potential income, which has been subject 
to criticism,71 as it excludes and effectively devalues nonworking 
populations such as the elderly and retired,72 and excludes a host 
of other potential monetary costs (resulting in monetized benefits 
of regulation), and other social and cultural concerns.  These are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 67. Sharon D. Wallace, Using Information Technology to Reduce a Health Risk: 
Effect of a Mercury Calculator on Consumer Fish Choices  and Test of a Model for 
Technology Acceptance by Fish Consumers 16–17 (Sept. 7, 2012) (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Trident University International).  Related studies have indicated a 
“statistically significant relationship existed between frequency of fish meals and 
level of MeHg in cord blood.”  Id. at 17. 
 68. See Jensen & Ruzickova, supra note 60, at 12 (indicating that “[c]hildren 
and fetuses appear to be more affected than the population as a whole[]” from the 
consumption of mercury in fish). 
 69. Id. at 18. 
 70. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2716 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the “EPA found that children of mothers exposed to high doses of 
mercury during pregnancy ‘have exhibited a variety of developmental neurological 
abnormalities,’ including delayed walking and talking, altered muscles, and 
cerebral palsy.”). 
 71. See Catherine A. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context: A 
Madness to EPA’s Method, 38 ENVTL. L. 495, 514 (2008) [hereinafter O’Neill, 
Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context]. 
 72. Id. at 528 (stating that CBA studies using a loss-in-earnings approach 
imply that “the lives of retired people are worth nothing—or perhaps less than 
nothing, since they consume scarce goods and services without earning or 
producing any marketed goods themselves.”). 
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III. Cultural Significance—Apportionment of Fishing 
Rights to Tribes and Related Effects 
a. The Majority of Elevated Mercury Levels are Found in 
Communities that Consume Large Amounts of Fish, 
Like Native American Communities, Many of Which 
Place Cultural Significance in Fishing or Live 
Subsistence Lifestyles 
Professor Catherine O’Neill captures the stark reality of 
mercury consumption in Native American communities nearly 
perfectly: 
This widespread [mercury] contamination poses a particular 
threat to many Native American peoples. Historically and in 
contemporary times, members of these fishing peoples 
consume more fish, at greater frequency, and in accordance 
with different cultural practices than the general population.73 
Many surveys conducted historically and into the modern day 
do not take into account the cultural and subsistence significance 
of activities such as fishing.74 
While the Supreme Court has given effective weight and 
consideration to CBA,75 as has the EPA (though not entirely to the 
Court’s satisfaction),76 environmental justice issues have largely 
been ignored to the EPA’s detriment.77  The EPA had an 
 
 73. Catherine A. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest: The Right to Catch and 
Consume Fish, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 131, 132 (2007) [hereinafter O’Neill, 
Protecting the Tribal Harvest]. 
 74. Id. at 134. 
 75. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015). 
 76. Clean Air Act—Cost Benefit Analysis—Michigan v. EPA, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
311, 312–13 (2015).  The Regulatory Impact Analysis, which included a calculation 
of costs and benefits, was issued alongside the final rule in order to comply with 
Executive Order 12,866.  Id. at 312.  The Executive Order required that agencies 
conduct CBA for “significant regulatory actions.”  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30,1993).  “Significant regulatory actions” are defined (in 
pertinent part) as: 
“Hav[ing] an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities[.]” 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 77. Executive Order No. 12,898 was issued by President Bill Clinton.  It 
requires, 
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, and consistent 
with the principles set forth in the report on the National Performance 
Review, each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice 
part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations in the United States and its territories and 
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opportunity to include the impacts on Native American 
communities, some of which were brought directly before them in 
earnest opposition to the overruled CAMR.  During the notice and 
comment period for the final CAMR, the National Congress of 
American Indians and Treaty Tribes issued comments discussing 
the harmful effects of un- and under-regulated mercury emissions, 
and the resulting havoc wrought on their communities.78 
The most problematic part about this is that the EPA issued 
a RIA quantifying the costs of industry compliance, discussing the 
dangers of mercury pollution in general terms, and specifically 
quantifying only the harms to recreational anglers who consumed 
their catch as the purported benefits.79  This is the same route 
taken by the EPA seven years later, still armed with the same 
information from tribal members, and still largely ignoring the 
impacts and harms their communities face by solely incorporating 
the harms of methylmercury consumption by recreational anglers 
and their children calculated through IQ loss.80  In fact, the EPA 
conceded that Native American populations would remain 
vulnerable when CAMR was proposed.81 Specifically, forty-five 
percent of the entire Native American population subject to the 
reach of the government of the United States (and thus the 
impacts of its regulations) would be exposed to “unsafe levels of 
utility-attributable mercury . . . .”82 
The effects on individual tribes and communities have come 
to light through studies conducted by legal scholars, and by the 
outcry of many tribal and community members themselves.  In 
particular, tribes from coastal areas, specifically the Pacific 
Northwest, Great Lakes region, and the Northeastern United 
States have expressed concern over the bioaccumulation in the 
fish and the problems that persist because of its infiltration.  In 
the Pacific Northwest, the Columbia River Basin is a vital 
resource for tribal fishing; one study (based on figures gathered by 
 
possessions, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
and the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands. 
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
 78. The EPA was aware of the impacts in Native American Populations, which 
arose under the notice and comment period for CAMR, which was effectively 
invalidated under the decision New Jersey v. EPA.  See O’Neill, Environmental 
Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 516, 534. 
 79. See FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64. 
 80. See id. at 7–25. 
 81. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest, supra note 74, at 136 (citing 
Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 69 Fed. Reg. 
4652, 4709) (Jan. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 60, 63). 
 82. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 517. 
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the EPA)83 captured the increased risk of contamination in Native 
American peoples versus the general population: 
Whereas someone consuming at the general population 
average rate (here, 7.5 grams [of fish]/day) is currently 
exposed to excess cancer risks ranging from 1 in 100,000 to 1 
in 10,000, a tribal member consuming subsistence rates as 
documented by Harris and Harper (540 grams/day) is 
currently exposed to cancer risks up to nearly 1 in 100.  The 
disparity is stark, with tribal members facing risks perhaps 
100 times that of the general population.84 
Another study conducted by the California Department of 
Natural Resources takes note of the detrimental effect that the 
loss of traditional food sources has on tribal members.  Focusing 
on the Karuk Tribe, a subsistence fishing tribe, the study 
demonstrated that the lack of availability of fish, due in part to 
contamination, has led to a “host of diet related illnesses among 
Native Americans . . . ”85 
In other circumstances, the EPA gave figures that were 
misleading and not representative of true consumption levels of 
subsistence fishing populations.  In the CAMR RIA, the EPA 
assumes an average fish consumption rate of twenty grams a 
day,86 a figure far below that of the Harris and Harper study noted 
above.  Though the figures come from studies conducted on 
different tribes, the EPA considered this an accurate figure for a 
subsistence fishing population.87 
Contamination and increasingly limited access to a vital 
resource impacts a tribe’s ability to practice their traditional 
subsistence lifestyle, and presents further harms that fall into 
quantifiable categories.  Increased medical costs for a population 
that undoubtedly suffers a higher risk of IQ loss, behavioral 
disorders, and the host of other disorders, diseases, and symptoms 
highly associated with increased mercury levels is just one area of 
would-be quantifiable risk assessment.  This can result in loss of 
future opportunities in the form of skilled jobs and ultimate 
 
 83. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest, supra note 74, at 137. 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. KARI MARIE NORGAARD, THE EFFECTS OF ALTERED DIET ON THE HEALTH OF 
THE KARUK 9 (2005).  These diet-related illnesses include “diabetes, obesity, heart 
disease, tuberculosis, hypertension, kidney troubles, and strokes.”  Id.  See also 
Health Disparities Experienced by American Indians and Alaska Natives, 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (Aug. 1, 2003), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5230.pdf (indicating that Native Americans and Alaskan Natives 
are two to three times as likely as all other ethnic populations combined to face 
these types of illnesses and symptoms). 
 86. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 524. 
 87. Id. at 524–25. 
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earning potential, setting affected children behind their peers and 
keeping them there.  Other impacts could be quantified in loss of 
potential fish sales as well.  There are some aspects of this 
injustice that are not quantifiable per se, but instead embody 
substantive legal rights that should extend far beyond the reach of 
CBA.  These are discussed below. 
b. Native American Communities Have Legal Rights to 
Apportioned Fisheries That Have Been Largely Ignored 
in Modern Environmental Regulation 
Many Native American communities, especially across the 
Northeastern, Great Lakes, and Pacific Northwest regions of the 
United States have apportioned fishing rights that have been 
secured through treaty agreements and rights.88 
Perhaps the most glaring and relevant omission in the EPA’s 
final RIA for the mercury ruling challenged in Michigan v. EPA is 
the exclusion of Native American peoples in their final calculation 
for the benefits of regulating mercury.89  In a dominant society, as 
the EPA clearly established, activities such as fishing and 
consuming catch are considered primarily recreational and 
economic in nature.90  While this is true on a large scale, this 
school of thought blatantly erases communities that subsist on 
fish, not only by consumption, but also through their ability to sell 
their catch.91 
Professor Catherine O’Neill makes an interesting point 
regarding this large area of United States law that remains 
relatively ignored, especially in regards to environmental justice.  
O’Neill notes that many Native American tribes were granted 
treaty rights, which often included access to vast swaths of land  
and, in the case of fishing tribes, access and apportionment rights 
to catch fish and consume as needed.92  Though not all tribes 
gained their rights through treaties,93 many tribes did.  Two very 
pertinent examples include tribes in the Pacific Northwest region 
and the Great Lakes region, in particular the Lake Superior 
 
 88. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 499. 
 89. See FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 
506 (stating that treaties protecteing fishing rights have been recognized to include 
both “tribal members’ right to fish in the ceded area, but also their right to 
consume the fish they catch or to sell it other others for others’ consumption”). 
 92. Id. at 505–06 n.47. 
 93. Id. (noting that some tribes gained right through “executive orders and 
other federal laws”). 
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Chippewa.94  These treaties granted rights to the Chippewa to 
catch, consume, and sell or trade fish.95  Professor O’Neill 
importantly notes that treaties are considered laws that deserve 
the highest deference; they reside in the hierarchy of laws just 
below the Constitution, are considered “the supreme law of the 
land”, and ultimately fall beyond the scope of CBA.96  
Unfortunately, consideration of these treaties and their 
importance failed to make the cut in the EPA’s final promulgated 
regulation. 
One of best opportunities that the EPA had when quantifying 
the benefits of increased regulation of mercury emissions was to 
consider the inability to replace fish, the industries, and lifestyles 
that they comprise and complement.  Although the fishing 
industry could likely be quantified, the cultural significance of a 
bygone resource upon which a population has been dependent for 
centuries is harder to quantify.  The fact of the matter is, fishing 
for subsistence populations is an activity that cannot be replaced.  
Fishing is an activity of identity, and it serves as a very important 
tradition to the people who practice it.97  There are some things 
that simply have no replacement; once they are gone or impaired, 
they cannot be fixed or returned.98  Put bluntly, subsistence 
fishing tribes cannot go fishing for tofu cubes in Lake Superior or 
Puget Sound.  A right with such high cultural importance has no 
substitute. 
Professor O’Neill coins an interesting phrase and 
accompanying concept, which is specifically applicable in a 
situation such as this.  She notes that agencies punt the issue; 
they practice “risk avoidance” as opposed to either “risk 
reduction,” or attacking the impacts of a particular problem from 
the source.99  For example, the EPA issues fish consumption 
advisories, warning people about the dangers of high fish 
consumption and essentially telling the population to consume less 
 
 94. Id. at 506. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 531 (1832)). 
 97. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 509. 
 98. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest Fish, supra note 74, at 139. 
 99. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 512; 
see also Catherine A. O’Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and 
Environmental Justice for Native Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2003) (describing the 
detrimental impacts of risk avoidance in Native American communities); Catherine 
A. O’Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and 
“Acceptable” Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2000); Catherine A. 
O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11070 (2004). 
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fish, especially larger, predatory fish.100  As Professor O’Neill 
notes, such risk avoidance fails to integrate other ecological and 
environmental effects, such as the bioaccumulation of the food 
chain in other mammals, the presence in the water and soil, and 
the fish themselves.101  Risk avoidance fails to incorporate the 
other harmful impacts of pollution and results in further 
detriment not only to Native American populations, but society at 
large.   
 Furthermore, there are some federalism issues at play 
regarding the regulatory structure of hazardous pollutants and 
where they should be regulated.102  In recent years, the EPA has 
struck down beneficial use regulations regulated under the Clean 
Water Act.103  The Clean Water Act gives much more deference to 
individual states than does the Clean Air Act, which controls air 
quality regulation, primarily from a federal standpoint.104  While 
the Clean Water Act is largely outside of the scope of this analysis, 
it warrants inclusion here as there is pending litigation over 
where beneficial uses, primarily regarding subsistence fishing and 
the rights of Native American peoples.105  Instead of bolstering 
CBA under the Clean Air Act regulations, as was the issue in 
Michigan v. EPA, the EPA is forcing the individual states to 
essentially rewrite their water quality standards in order to 
combat the effects of mercury poisoning and the effects on fish-
consuming populations.106  Not only does this frustrate the already 
complex federalism structure, but it is only a reactionary measure 
as much of the mercury found in water and fish comes from air 
 
 100. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 512. 
 101. Id. (stating that risk avoidance fails to measure “the harms that 
contamination visits on non-human species, such as loons and mink, who obviously 
cannot read fish consumption advisories.”). 
 102. The federalism issues discussed in this section are strictly vertical; they 
apply to the cooperative federalism structure that comprises the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act.  Although important to mention in this note, a more in-depth 
analysis is beyond the scope of the argument presented in this Article. 
 103. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(b) (2012). 
 104. Id. Under the Clean Air Act, states submit State Implementation Plans 
that must be approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2012).  In contrast, the 
Clean Water Act grants deference to states on how to monitor and allocate water 
resources subject to overarching federal oversight. 
 105. See Sean McLernon, Maine Sues EPA Over Control of State’s Tribal Waters, 
LAW 360, (July 7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/555064/maine-sues-epa-
over-control-of-state-s-tribal-waters (indicating that Maine has brought a lawsuit 
against the EPA seeking a “declaration that its environmental jurisdiction applies 
uniformly throughout the state, including waters within Indian territories.”). 
 106. Id. 
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pollution.107  Moreover, it places the states into a hard position by 
forcing them to regulate something that they cannot necessarily 
control,108 and punts the issue by not regulating the issue at the 
source.109 
IV. Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis Including the Impacts 
on Cultural Fish Consumption 
The primary idea behind Bayesian110 Cost-Benefit Analysis is 
the incorporation of previously “unquantified” benefits into the 
overall equation of CBA.111  This requires the agency experts to 
“make reasonable guesses about the harms or benefits from 
regulations” despite occasions “where they lack complete 
data . . . .”112  According to Professors Jonathan Masur and Eric 
Posner, these preliminary guesses constitute Bayesian prior 
probabilities.  “While agencies should be permitted to ‘guess’—that 
is, supply a subjective prior probability—they must also be 
required to update their estimates as they gain new 
information.”113  This is especially appropriate given the 
administrative law principles surrounding Chevron deference;114 
the court system defers to agencies as they make these kinds of 
decisions. 
The primary problem with the EPA’s analysis is that they did 
not update their primary monetized benefits with which they 
marched through the courtroom door.  The recreational angler and 
 
 107. John Myers, Study: Most Mercury in Lake Superior Comes from 
Atmosphere, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.duluthnews
tribune.com/news/3924020-study-most-mercury-lake-superior-comes-atmosphere. 
 108. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE 
(CSAPR), https://www.epa.gov/csapr (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
 109. See BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY, supra note 51. 
 110. Eric W. Weisstein, Bayesian Analysis, MATH WORLD—A WOLFRAM WEB 
RESOURCE, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BayesianAnalysis.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2017) (“Bayesian analysis is a statistical procedure which endeavors to estimate 
parameters of an underlying distribution based on the observed distribution.”). 
 111. Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 100–13. 
 112. Id. at 92. 
 113. Id. Professors Masur and Posner went on to list clarifying recommendations 
for agencies engaging in Bayesian CBA: 
In particular, agencies should be required (1) to provide a mechanism for 
empirically evaluating their estimates after the regulation is issued; (2) to 
revisit and update their earlier estimates in light of what subsequent 
studies reveal; and (3) to use consistent estimates across agencies.  We 
describe our proposal as loosely “Bayesian” because of the emphasis on the 
importance of updating priors as an institutional solution to the problem of 
regulatory uncertainty. 
Id. at 92–93. 
 114. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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fish consumption category had been put through the fire, so to 
speak, as it was the basis for the pervious mercury standards that 
were overruled.115  The most heavily impacted communities 
presented the EPA with concerns about mercury contamination, 
yet these communities were effectively left out of the solution 
equation.116  While some studies have shown that recreational 
fishing can pose an increased risk because of elevated levels of 
methylmercury,117 this remains only one area of quantified risk, as 
shown by the EPA,118 in a country where many of the citizens 
consume fish. 
Some commentators believe that while CBA is a popular tool 
that has been utilized in legislation and rulemaking, the 
constraints of its rigid application need to be recognized, in 
addition to what exactly CBA does, and is intended to do.119  
Simply put, CBA is a decision procedure that can be used as a less 
expensive alternative to other tools.120  With this critique comes 
the urging, that because CBA is a decision procedure, and not a 
moral one, CBA needs to be kept in context as it is utilized.121  
CBA also needs to be accommodating to alternative means in 
which to measure unquantified benefits and non-monetized 
values, like the benefits of protecting resources of high cultural 
significance, among others.122 
There are conflicting views on how best to monetize 
unquantified benefits, or how to value them in a non-monetary 
manner.  While Bayesian analysis relies on experts’ relevant 
experiences and estimates, it is still difficult to assign a price 
value to something that does not have a monetized value.  Natural 
resources often fall into this category.  A rather simple example 
would include forest preservation and the associated health 
benefits with cleaner air.  While it is possible to monetize, at least 
to some extent, the improved health benefits associated with clean 
air, it is much harder to assign a monetary value to something like 
 
 115. Standards for Performance for New and Existing Sources: Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75). 
 116. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 534–
36. 
 117. Wallace, supra note 68, at 13. 
 118. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015). 
 119. Adler & Posner, supra note 15, at 168. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  The Supreme Court’s (and federal government at large) move towards 
the use of CBA is pertinent to this analysis, an in-depth look at the structure of it 
at large is outside the scope. 
 122. Id. 
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the aesthetics of a forest.  The clean air can be accounted for with 
the preservation of a forest, but individual values on larger 
resources vary.  Some people place value in simply knowing such a 
place exists.  The waters of CBA begin to get murky in these areas 
of analysis; in relation to this note, it is cultural value associated 
with cultural practices that are hard to quantify, and are thus 
simply left out of CBA. 
One commentator has suggested that the best way to account 
for benefits is to split them into categories.  He laid them out in 
the following chart, specifically pertaining to cultural examples of 
costs and benefits:123 
 
 123. Dupuis, supra note 15, at 10. 
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The categorical separation occurs in four primary arenas 
(monetary/real,124 tangible/intangible,125 internal/external,126 
final/immediate127) as exemplified above, and breaks the costs and 
benefits down into a more representative example, as these 
categories include the preciously unquantified benefits.128  
Admittedly, identification into each of these categories can be 
extremely difficult, which is one of the reasons that so many of 
them are not included in larger cost-benefit analyses. Professor 
Dupuis noted: 
The fact is that the implications of projects in practically every 
case concern far larger areas and populations than those 
under the direct responsibility of the authorities 
concerned . . . [Additionally], [t]he various implications of a 
project may vary in the time they take to appear or 
disappear.129 
These categories bolster the framework of Bayesian CBA, by 
allowing the previously unquantified benefits to be exemplified 
and presented, instead of simply allowing agencies to exclude 
benefits that could not be monetized from CBA.  Unfortunately, 
this was the route taken by the EPA in the case at issue in 
Michigan v. EPA, and has been a route taken by the EPA for many 
years.130 
 
 124. Id.  Further: 
Real costs and benefits, for their part, are not expressed in money terms. 
They are real in the sense that it is they that affect the general level of 
satisfaction of society. Since they relate to the development of individual 
and social values their nature is complex. Sometimes impossible to 
quantify they are, in most cases, difficult at the very least even to identify 
clearly. 
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). 
 125. Id. at 7–8 (“Tangible costs and benefits refer to those to which a market 
value can be assigned, either directly or indirectly, by the various methods we have 
described. Intangible costs and benefits are those for which a market valuation 
proves impossible or is completely meaningless.”). 
 126. Id. at 8.  Dupuis describes internal and external costs and benefits as vital 
to analyses that include qualitative components, such as cultural value and 
significance.  Id.  Specifically, “an externality is considered to exist where there is 
interdependence but no compensation . . . . Internal costs and benefits are those 
directly related to the implementation of the project whereas external costs and 
benefits are all those inferred by the project.”  Id. 
 127. Id. at 9 (“A cost or benefit is ‘final’ if it is borne by or directly benefits the 
end consumer. An intermediate cost or benefit arises at the level of the production 
of other goods or services and will therefore affect the welfare of consumers 
(measured in terms of surplus) only in an indirect manner.”). 
 128. Id. at 10. 
 129. Id. at 8.  While calculation of unquantified benefits is important, actual 
calculation of the unquantified benefits at issue here are beyond the scope of this 
analysis. 
 130. Adler & Posner, supra note 15, at 175–76. 
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a. The EPA Only Quantified the Costs to Recreational 
Anglers Who Consume Their Catch; Other Non-
Monetized Benefits Should Be Assumed and Accounted 
For, and as a Result, the Direct Benefits Would Greatly 
Increase 
According to the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA, some 
form of CBA must be conducted; however, as Justice Scalia noted 
in the opinion, it need not be completely formalized.131  In 
Michigan, the EPA described their quantified benefits as follows: 
The monetized benefits from reductions in mercury emissions, 
calculated only for children exposed to recreationally caught 
freshwater fish, are expected to be $0.004 to $0.006 billion in 
2016 using a 3% discount rate and $0.0005 to $0.001 billion 
using a 7% discount rate. The annual social costs, 
approximated by the compliance costs, are $9.6 billion (2007$) 
and the annual monetized net benefits are $27 to $80 billion 
using 3% discount rate or $24 to $71 billion using a 7% 
discount rate.132 
This process, while used by most agencies in regulatory CBA, 
presents a limited perception of the direct benefits derived from 
mercury regulation, with the glaring omissions of benefits to other 
human activity and well-being.  In fact, the EPA acknowledges 
this: 
EPA was unable to quantify or monetize all of the health and 
environmental benefits associated with the final MATS Rule. 
EPA believes these unquantified benefits could be substantial, 
including the overall value associated with HAP reductions, 
value of increased agricultural crop and commercial forest 
yields, visibility improvements, and reductions in nitrogen and 
acid deposition and the resulting changes in ecosystem 
functions.133 
Professors Masur and Posner very candidly note that benefits 
are often much harder to identify and quantify than the costs of 
something like industry compliance, and they hint at the internal 
biases of CBA when it is applied in a very strict form (as it often is 
in regulatory measures).134  Unfortunately, this often results in 
leaving very important benefits by the wayside, which gives only a 
fractured picture of what should be an otherwise holistic analysis. 
 
 131. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015) (“We need not and do not 
hold that the law unambiguously required the Agency, when making this 
preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each 
advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value.”). 
 132. FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64, at ES-1. 
 133. Id. at ES-9. 
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What about the host of other problems that stem from 
methylmercury ingestion?  While a loss in IQ points is certainly a 
large concern, and in some circumstances may even encompass 
other problems associated with a drop in IQ, the EPA did not 
calculate these other impacts.  As mentioned earlier, the EPA only 
calculated the impacts anticipated from a drop in potential 
income.135  Thus, the EPA’s analysis left out the benefits in 
curbing the effects on other organs and decreasing behavioral 
disorders, impaired motor skills, and other identified impacts.136 
Professor O’Neill discusses a few problems with this analysis, 
especially when examining the traditions and livelihoods that are 
incorporated in many Native American communities.  These 
values do not capture the importance of other roles filled in the 
community.  For instance, things like lost productivity are not 
measured, which is something that other agencies have 
measured.137  While there may be an argument that this figure is 
rolled into the loss of potential income, the addition of this 
calculation would no doubt bolster the EPA’s analysis.  These two 
calculations provide just two examples of other areas in which the 
EPA could have expanded their calculations to close in on the CBA 
balance threshold, and in a major way.  By including a population 
that requires vital attention due to cultural significance with a 
threatened resource and increased threats to this resource, their 
values could have (and still can) climb higher than a similar 
comparison with a subset of dominant society. 
The EPA quantified the loss in individual IQ points in both 
the CAMR RIA and the Final RIA, and used the same criteria for 
each.  The 2005 CAMR RIA quantified each lost IQ point at $8,807 
(adjusted for inflation for the year 2015, the value reaches 
$10,688.22 per IQ point).138  This is the bare minimum; it is only 
one subsection of the greater population of the United States, and 
only one quantified benefit calculated for one negative impact of 
methylmercury (otherwise a benefit for regulation).  In addition, 
the EPA stated that, though the Native American communities 
would be adversely affected by the methylmercury accumulation 
in a primary food source, the impacts would not be very large 
 
 135. FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64, at 4-2. 
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because of their location; most Native American communities were 
not located next to large EGUs.139  It is important to note that to 
claim this is to ignore the global impacts of emissions, which have 
become an increasing problem since the rise of the industrial age. 
b. Issues to Consider Going Forward: The Participation of 
the United States in International Emissions 
Standards. 
Not all of the emissions come directly from utilities and 
industrial sites in the United States.  In fact, some recent studies 
show that some mercury emissions in the Upper Great Lakes140 
could be coming from as far away as China.141  Emissions do not 
obey political or jurisdictional boundaries just because a 
smokestack points skyward and it does not mean the contents it 
carries remain suspended there. 
One study applied the lens of the widespread effects of 
mercury pollution; the results indicated decreased IQ levels in 
children, with costs ranging anywhere from $2.2–$43.8 billion in 
lost productivity annually ($2.64 billion–$52.5 billion when 
adjusted for inflation in the year 2014).  While these numbers 
clearly exceed populations of Native American children alone, 
these figures provide one example of some of the available 
information that could have been analyzed alongside the 
information the EPA ended up using.  Put into a larger context, 
this one measurement begins to give a shape to the vast, negative 
impacts that require a global solution.  While jurisdictional 
constraints require the EPA to regulate within the borders of the 
United States, the global impacts of mercury emissions (among 
others) should begin to prompt global discussions in the future.142 
Conclusion 
Seeing as the Supreme Court has unanimously moved in the 
direction of mandating CBA for major regulations, the EPA (and 
other agencies) need to expand the scope of their CBA, including 
those benefits not previously considered “quantifiable” through 
Bayesian CBA.  So far, the EPA has largely ignored this new 
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requirement.  Specifically, the EPA issued a legal memorandum 
claiming that they followed the required regulations by including 
the cost of compliance incrementally and inherently through the 
MACT standards (despite being overruled).143  The primary 
problem with this is that the Court has already ruled that this is 
an inadequate way to conduct CBA, thus the EPA is setting 
themselves up to be overruled again.  The EPA has an excellent 
opportunity to include more benefits resulting from heightened 
regulations of mercury, and should do so in order to avoid being 
overruled in the future. 
One of the best opportunities that the EPA has to expand its 
analysis with regards to benefits is Native American populations 
that rely on subsistence fishing; the impacts that accrue with 
populations that consume higher concentrations of fish yield 
higher benefits.  This one area could greatly bolster the EPA’s 
analysis in the future, and may serve as a catalyst for other 
federal agencies moving forward. As explained above, this is 
primarily done through Bayesian CBA, a school of thought that 
works to quantify benefits that are by their very nature (and the 
existing structure of law and economics) unquantifiable.  These 
analyses will help the government and the regulations 
promulgated by agencies, particularly in regards to environmental 
impacts, to keep vulnerable populations and issues of deep 
cultural significance protected.  These issues are part of the 
equation and should be treated as such. 
For better or for worse, regulation increases when negative 
impacts of processes, products, and activities in daily life are 
discovered.  Individuals and communities certainly want to limit, 
to the extent possible, the vague and sometimes unforeseen 
problems that could arise in the future.  This is especially true in 
regards to finite and precious resources, and ultimately human life 
and its quality.  These important things are threatened by 
permanent change for which there is no remedy.  It is incumbent 
upon the United States as a nation to address these problems up 
front for what they are, and work to mitigate the negative impacts 
as much as possible.  This work includes the most vulnerable 
among us; despite perceived population size and location, 
acceptable risk is ultimately no greater for one person than it is 
another.  Incorporating their risk and the value of their traditions 
is vital as the United States moves forward in the twenty-first 
century. 
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